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Negative Interest Rates and Corporate Tax Behavior in Banks 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the impact of negative interest rate (NIR) regimes on corporate tax behavior. 
We argue that NIRs act as a de-facto tax levied by central banks and investigate how this ‘tax’ 
affects banks’ corporate tax planning. Using a sample of domestic banks in OECD countries and 
a difference-in-difference research design, we find that banks affected by negative interest rate 
policies exhibit an increase in tax planning following the adoption of NIR, compared to unaffected 
banks. We document that the introduction of NIRs is associated with a 2.3 to 2.6 percentage point 
decrease in GAAP ETR and that the effects of NIRs are more pronounced in banks with a lower 
distance to default or lower reserves, and in countries with lower levels of tax enforcement or 
lower levels of trust in the government. Collectively, our results suggest that NIRs lead banks to 
increase tax planning as a funding source.  
 
  




Negative Interest Rates and Corporate Tax Behavior of Banks  
1. Introduction 
This study examines the effect of negative interest rates on the corporate tax planning 
behavior of banks.1 While long considered only to be a theoretical possibility, there is an increasing 
global trend towards the use of negative interest rates. This trend is likely to persist given that 
interest rates remain at, or near, historically low levels for many countries (Del Negro et al., 2019). 
Negative interest rates affect the cost of funds available to banks because instead of generating 
interest revenue on excess reserves, banks are charged a fee on their excess reserves by central 
banks. In this sense, negative interest rates force banks to bear additional costs while managing 
the trade-off between their liquidity requirements and the opportunity cost of holding excess 
reserves.2  
By charging a fee to banks, the Central Bank disincentivizes banks from holding cash, 
which in turn should encourage lending at lower rates. The underlying rationale for the 
implementation of a negative interest rate regime is that it incentivizes debtors (creditors) to 
borrow (save) more (less) and stimulate the economy through increased spending until negative 
interest rates are no longer needed. Given that central banks are wholly owned subsidiaries of the 
government, their operating results revert back to the treasury. Therefore, negative interest rates 
serve as a de-facto tax levied by the central bank on banks. In theory this ‘tax’ can be borne by 
 
1 Our study examines a variety of credit institutions, which we refer to collectively as “banks”. We expect the 
incentives and behavior we study to be relatively consistent across different deposit holding and lending institutions. 
Our sample includes: Bank holdings & holding companies, Commercial banks, Cooperative banks, Finance companies, 
Investment & Trust corporations, Investment banks, Other non-banking credit institutions, Private banking/Asset 
management companies, Real Estate & Mortgage banks, Savings banks, and Securities firms. 
2 Excess reserves represent bank deposits at the Federal Reserve that are above what the bank is legally required to 
hold to back their checkable deposits.  




shareholders through lower after-tax profits/higher risk, by depositors through lower interest rates, 
or by borrowers through higher interest rates and/or fees. 
While Central Banks can employ many different monetary tools to achieve policy, negative 
interest rates have become increasingly prominent.3 As of August 2019, 25% of all government 
bonds ($15 trillion) world-wide, have negative interest rates and this number has tripled since 
October 2018 (Fitzgerald, 2019). Since 2014, many central banks, including the Danmarks 
National Bank (DNB), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Swiss National Bank (SNB), the 
Swedish Riks Bank, and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) have reduced their policy rates to below zero. 
While the primary reason for negative interest rates has been to manage inflation expectations and 
generate increases in economic growth, negative interest rates have been utilized in some 
jurisdictions, such as Switzerland and Denmark, to stabilize the exchange rate.  
 The academic literature has largely focused on the concept of a zero lower bound for 
interest because, in theory, a depositor could always store physical currency to avoid negative 
interest rates (Bech and Malkhozov, 2016). In a similar vein, banks, at least theoretically, could 
choose to reduce their excess capital reserves to zero to avoid negative interest rate penalties. While 
banks are heavily regulated, Basel III requires commercial and depository banks to meet certain 
minimum capital requirements. Following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, many central banks, 
including those in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, began paying interest on excess reserves to 
disincentivize reserve avoidance and to encourage banks to hold more reserves. In response, capital 
reserves have increased dramatically. As an example, U.S. commercial banks’ capital reserves 
increased from $1.9 billion in August 2008 to $2.6 trillion in January 2015 (Craig and Koepke, 
 
3 Central banks have three tools of monetary policy: open market operations, reserve requirements, and the discount 
rate. Central Bank chooses monetary policy in accordance to how well it can implement it. 




2015)4. Given the large size of capital reserves, negative interest rates would be expected to have 
a material impact on banks’ business operations.  
To examine how negative interest rate policies affects banks’ income tax planning behavior, 
we employ a sample of domestic banks from OECD countries, where a number of countries have 
implemented negative interest rate regimes, and exploit the staggered introduction of those 
negative interest rate policies in specific countries during the 2010s.5  Using a difference-in-
difference research design, our primary analysis documents that the introduction of a negative 
interest rate regime is associated with an approximate 2.3 to 2.6 percentage point decrease in 
GAAP effective tax rates.  
These findings are robust to a number of alternative specifications. Importantly, despite the 
staggered adoption of negative interest rates, when we align the event time of negative interest rate 
policy adoptions, a parallel trend exists between our treatment and control groups. Additionally, 
our results are not driven by a specific country and remain both negative and significant with the 
inclusion of U.S. banks to our control group and with the exclusion of Japanese banks (who 
underwent a tax reform in 2016) to our treatment group. Our results are also stronger when we 
remove the negative interest rate implementation year for each country to allow banks more time 
to adjust their tax planning. The inferences also remain unchanged when additional tax planning 
variables (i.e., loan loss provisions and off-balance sheet items) are added as control variables, and 
when we propensity score match our treated firms based on size, profitability (ROAE), equity ratio, 
and liquidity. In a falsification test, using 0.05% as the pseudo introduction of a negative interest 
 
4 See https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EXCSRESNS for the excess Reserves of Depository Institutions. In May 2020, 
excess reserves plateaued at $3.2 trillion.  
5 Our sample includes only domestic banks because multinational banks may operate in countries with both negative 
and positive interest rate regimes. 




rate regime, we do not observe a significant effect. This provides comfort that our findings are not 
an artifact of our research design. 
We also perform a number of cross-sectional analyses. Specifically, we provide evidence 
that the effect of negative interest rate policies on tax planning is concentrated on banks with 
greater financial constraints, as evidenced through banks with a lower distance to default and with 
lower reserves. We also document that the effect is concentrated in countries with lower levels of 
tax enforcement and in countries with lower levels of trust in the government. These results suggest 
that banks in these countries are better able to or are more willing to reduce their income tax 
payments when faced with negative interest rates. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first paper investigating the effect of negative interest rates on banks’ corporate tax 
behavior. While answering the call for more research on the taxation of financial institutions 
(Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010), we show that monetary policy is an important determinant of banks’ 
tax planning (Scholes et al., 1990).  Consistent with our argument that negative interest rates are 
de-facto taxes, we also contribute to the broader literature on the effect of various forms of taxation 
on banks (Andries et al., 2017; de Mooij et al., 2013; Schepens, 2016).  
Second, we contribute to the literature on the effect of government economic interventions 
on banks. Our study complements recent work examining the introduction of bank-specific levies 
and their impact on the behavior of such banks (Buch et al., 2016; Capelle-Blancard and 
Havrylchyk, 2017; Devereux et al., 2019; Kogler, 2019). While negative interest rates increase the 
banks’ funding cost, our results suggest that banks internalize some of the cost and adjust their 
corporate taxes to increase internally generated funds.  




Finally, our results should be of interest to policymakers considering the implementation 
of negative interest rate regimes. Highlighting the potential broadening of these types of policies, 
in response to the current Coronavirus Pandemic, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s key rate has been set 
near zero, at 0.25%. While negative interest rates are widely considered as a measure of last resort 
that are to be used after all other stimulus tools have been exhausted, given persistently low interest 
rates, many countries could consider the adoption of this monetary tool (Buchanan and Dorf, 2016). 
By showing the spillover effect of this monetary policy tool on bank corporate tax behavior, this 
study adds to the on-going discussion regarding the consequences of negative interest rates. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background 
information and develops our hypothesis; Section 3 describes the data and outlines the empirical 
design; Sections 4 and 5 present the empirical results and a discussion of the findings; and Section 
6 concludes.  
2. Background and Hypothesis Developments 
Following Dyreng et al. (2008), many studies have examined the determinants and 
consequences of corporate tax avoidance. Determinants include a variety of firm-specific 
characteristics, incentives, constraints, and executive characteristics (see Wilde and Wilson 2018 
for a review.) Despite the large tax planning literature, little is known about the banking industry 
because most studies remove the financial service sector from cross-industry samples. The 
arguments frequently presented for their exclusion are that financial firms can bias the results given 
that they have high leverage (Fama and French, 1992) and substantial regulatory differences 
(Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). While this design choice in the study of broad research questions 
related to taxation has merit, it leaves the examination of the impact of taxation on financial 




institutions as a potentially understudied area. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) specifically make a 
call for additional research on the taxation of financial institutions.  
Importantly, banks, like non-financial firms, should consider income taxes in their decision 
making. Like other profitable firms, taxes can represent a substantial and material expense for 
banks, which should be considered and managed in in similar manner. There are many strategies 
that a bank can implement to reduce its corporate taxes. Banks can shift increased tax costs to their 
borrowers through higher interest rates, to depositors though lower deposit rates, or a combination 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Albertazzi & Gambacorta, 2010; Chiorazzo & Milani, 2011). 
Banks can also increase their reliance on debt to take advantage of interest deductibility 
(Hemmelgarn & Teichmann, 2014; Schandlbauer, 2017; Milonas, 2018), securitize loans to off-
balance sheet items (Han et al., 2015), shift profits to low tax jurisdictions (Merz & Overesch, 
2016), or restructure their organizational form (Hodder et al., 2003, Donohoe et al., 2019). We 
provide additional details and information regarding the strategies below.  
2.1 Financial Institutions and Tax Planning  
Scholes et al. (1990) document evidence that banks trade-off tax and non-tax factors in 
making their investment and financing decisions.  In support of this notion, Merz and Overesch 
(2016) document that the reported earnings of multinational banks’ subsidiaries significantly 
respond to host country tax incentives. Their study finds that the tax response of reported 
profitability is even more pronounced than for MNCs in other industries, which indicates that 
multinational banks have large tax-planning opportunities.  
While some prior literature documents evidence of international profit shifting by 
multinational banks (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999, 2001), recent studies explore how banks 
adjust their behavior in response to the introduction of tax transparency instruments. Joshi et al. 




(2020) utilize the introduction of mandatory EU country-by-country tax disclosures for financial 
institutions to find a meaningful decrease in the profit shifting activities of financial subsidiaries 
after the reform but no change to the overall tax avoidance. On the contrary, Overesch and Wolff, 
(2021) find that multinational banks increase their tax expense relative to other banks unaffected 
by the Country-by-Country Reporting mandate.  
2.2 Taxes on the Financial Sector 
Shackelford et al. (2010)  note that before the 2007-2008 financial crisis, regulation, instead 
of specific tax policy instruments, was used to address financial sector issues.6 However, in the 
aftermath of the crisis, many countries began to reform taxation so that governments could collect 
the high cost associated with banking interventions and to internalize commercial banks’ 
contribution to systemic economic risk.  
More recently, several studies have examined how income taxes and the related 
enforcement activities can impact commercial bank behavior. For example, using private U.S. 
commercial banks, Donohoe et al. (2019) find that greater competition from S corporation banks 
increase the likelihood that rival C corporation banks convert to Subchapter S status and that 
converting banks increase their interest rates on customer deposits and advertising intensity. Both 
Schandlbauer (2017) and Milonas (2018) use changes in U.S. state corporate tax rates to address 
the impact of changing tax rates on financial institutions. Schandlbauer (2017) documents that in 
response to tax rate increases, banks increase their leverage ratio to benefit from the increased tax 
shield. Additionally, when faced with higher corporate tax rates, banks who cannot reduce their 
taxes through increased debt reduce lending. Milonas (2018) suggests that while banks decrease 
their capital ratio in response to tax rate increases, a symmetric effect exists for tax decreases. The 
 
6 The tax system can act as a substitute for banking regulations and change banks’ behaviours. For example, banks’ 
loan loss provisions are positively associated with tax rates (Andries et al., 2017). 




results also hold in cross-country analyses whereby corporate income tax reforms are shown to 
impact leverage, dividend policies and earnings management of banks (Hemmelgarn and 
Teichmann, 2014). In a similar vein, Petroni and Shackelford (1995) provide evidence that 
property-casualty insurers structure their cross-state expansion to mitigate both state tax and 
regulatory costs. Gallemore and Jacob (2020) examine the effect of enforce on lending. They 
document that higher levels of tax enforcement on small and midsized enterprises can increase 
lending to those firms. 
Prior research also provides evidence that various international tax policies can change 
multinational bank behavior in an effort to reduce taxes (Gu et al., 2015).  Huizinga et al. (2014) 
find that the international double taxation of foreign income distorts international banking 
activities by decreasing foreign direct investment. Their study also finds that the impact of the 
double taxation is passed onto foreign bank customers through higher interest margins. Hepfer et 
al. (2020) show that taxes were an important incentive for foreign-owned life insurance firms to 
use shadow insurance pre-TCJA.  
In addition to income taxes, governments can tax banks through the use of levies. In the 
aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 14 European countries introduced a bank specific levy 
on either the banks’ secured liabilities, unsecured liabilities, or risk weighted assets.7  While these 
levies differ regarding terms and bases, the general purpose was to reduce the riskiness of the 
banking sector and to ensure that future costs associated with banking crises would be internalized 
by banks so that public funds would not be needed to stabilize the banking sector.8  To harmonize 
 
7 The 14 European countries are: Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
8 A bank levy is a tax on specific elements of the balance sheet. The tax could be on total assets, total regulatory capital, 
covered deposits, non-insured liabilities or uninsured liabilities. The rationale is to increase the cost of borrowing and 
thus make banks rely more on equity funding.  The bank levy is like a Pigouvian tax: it corrects banks’ excessive risk-
taking behaviour by making banks pay for the negative externalities associated with bank distress.  For example, 




different national level bank levies, the European Union introduced the Single Resolution Fund, 
with collections beginning in 2016. Consistent with banks changing behavior in response to 
changes in taxation, prior research documents that bank specific levies impact individual bank 
behavior. Devereux et al. (2019) document that while banks reduce their leverage in response to 
bank levies, they also increase risk. Using a German setting, Buch et al. (2016) find that banks 
affected by bank levies reduce lending and increase rates. Kogler (2019) extends the results to 
show that lending and deposit rates increase for countries that adopted a bank levy in the European 
Union relative to those that did not.  
2.3 The Effect of Negative Interest Rates on Banks  
 Prior research has examined the effect of monetary policy on various non-tax behavior. 
While significant research exists regarding changes in bank behavior and their role as a monetary 
policy transmission mechanism, the literature is largely based on expansionary or contractionary 
policy within the confines of positive, albeit at times very low, interest rates. Traditionally, central 
banks reduce interest rates to promote bank lending. However, in very low interest rate 
environments, the ability to reduce interest rates to provide monetary stimulus is small (Bernanke, 
2020; Borio and Gambacorta, 2017) and could even become contractionary (Brunnermeier and 
Koby, 2018). Many economists previously believed that Central Banks had a zero lower bound 
(ZLB) because anything less would cause a widespread conversion of deposits into currency 
(Swanson, 2018).  
One of the criticisms of imposing negative interest rates is that it potentially reduces the 
profitability of banks which could cause higher lending rates and reduce the supply of credit. 
 
Germany introduced a progressive bank levy from 0% and 0.06% on total liabilities net of equity and insured deposits. 
Another tax base is all off-balance sheet derivatives (taxed on their nominal value) with the tax rate of 0.0003%.  The 
levy is capped at 20% of annual net income, but also has a minimum charge of 5% (even if the bank has losses). 




However, the empirical evidence on bank profitability is somewhat mixed given that the impact 
of negative interest rate regimes on banks varies according to the bank’s business model (Bohn et 
al., 2020). Eggertsson et al. (2017) find that negative interest rates are not passed on through 
aggregate deposit or lending rates, and that banks are reluctant to reduce deposit rates fearing a 
loss of their funding base (Heider et al., 2019). Claessens et al. (2018) document that bank 
profitability is negatively related to the level of lending rates and that while banks can adjust other 
aspects of the business to offset low rates, it is difficult for banks to maintain their income if low 
interest rate environments persist. Consistent with this, Molyneux et al. (2019) find that bank 
margins and profits fell in negative interest rate adopter countries relative to countries that did not 
adopt a negative interest rate. In contrast, Lopez et al. (2020) find little overall impact of negative 
nominal rates on bank profitability because while banks experience losses in interest income, it is 
almost exactly offset by savings on deposit expenses and gains in non-interest income given that 
banks can respond to negative interest rates by charging additional fees/commissions or relying 
less on deposits to maintain margins. While not directly assessing bank profitability, Capelle-
Blancard and Havrylchyk (2017) document that banks are only able to shift the burden of the levy 
to their customers through higher interest and fee margins for borrowers over which they exercise 
market power. 
One of the reasons for the conflicting results on bank profitability is that the risk profile of 
lending may change. For margins to remain unchanged banks may choose to increase risk or reduce 
lending altogether. This is consistent with Molyneux et al. (2020) who find that, following the 
introduction of negative interest rates, bank lending was weaker in negative interest rate adoption 




countries and Bubeck et al. (2019) who find that negative interest rate adoption affects the 
securities holdings of banks.9 
2.4 Negative Interest Rates and Taxes   
While negative interest rates clearly alter the opportunity cost for banks on holding reserves, 
whether or not the imposition of negative interest rates impact the tax planning of banks is an open 
empirical question. Molyneux et al. (2019) document that bank margins and profitability decrease 
following the adoption of negative interest rates. The results can be explained because bank 
lending (i.e., volume) decreases (Molyneux et al. 2020) and banks are unable to pass on the 
increased costs (i.e., margin) to depositors (Heider et al., 2019).  
Although profitability is reduced, it is unclear how reduced profitability will translate into 
tax planning. Rego (2003) documents a negative relation between tax planning and pre-tax income 
in a broad sample that excludes financial firms. While she argues that more profitable firms have 
greater incentives and resources to engage in tax planning, low profitability may provide a strong 
incentive in the banking sector to reduce taxes. Low profitability is particularly troublesome for 
banks because it reduces the banks’ ability to build up capital reserves (i.e., retained earnings), 
which reduces banks' future ability to lend capital. Therefore, current profitability may negatively 
impact future profitability. With fewer prospects, banks may not be able to raise debt and equity 
to circumvent the issue. In that sense, the best option may be to raise internally generated funds 
via tax planning (Edwards et al., 2016).  
Prior research has documented in other settings that the introduction of new taxes and/or 
regulations can sometimes induce a tax substitution effect. Individual banks may alter their 
 
9 Prior research has documented other effects of negative interest rates. For example, in response to negative interest 
rates, banks appear to adjust their balance sheets towards riskier asset classes (Basten & Mariathasan, 2018; Demiralp 
et al., 2017). 




business model through reduced risk provisioning  (Borio et al., 2017), charging higher fees on 
other products (Turk, 2016), or increasing risk (Heider et al., 2019). Using value-added tax (VAT) 
changes, Olbert and Werner (2019) find that firms adjust their output as a response to changes in 
consumption taxes. Following the introduction of bank levies on bank liabilities, Bremus et al. 
(2020) find that banks reduce leverage but that the reduction in leverage is less prevalent when 
banks are faced with higher corporate income tax rates. Taken together, these studies provide 
evidence of changes in firm and bank behavior to taxes and levies. Based on this prior work, it is 
possible sthat banks will increase their tax planning activities in response to the adoption of a 
negative interest rate regime.  
Conversely, banks could try to intentionally overpay taxes to reduce reserves in response 
to the introduction of negative interest rates. In a negative interest rate environment, overpayment 
of taxes could potentially benefit banks as it protects the value of funds from being eroded. The 
benefit exists if banks do not have better alternative uses for the funds or if the time horizon for 
negative interest rates is small.  
From above, ex-ante, it is not clear how banks will adjust their tax planning in response to 
negative interest rates. Thus, we make the following null hypothesis: 
H1: Negative interest rates are not associated with changes in the tax planning behavior 
of banks. 
3. Sample and Research Design 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample consists of all domestic banks domiciled within the member countries of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) during the period 2011-




2017.10 We begin our sample period in 2011 to straddle the adoption of negative interest rate 
regimes that occurred throughout the 2010s. The first country to adopt negative interest rates in 
our sample is Denmark in 2012. The last country to adopt negative interest rates in our sample is 
Japan in 2016. We restrict the sample period to a relatively short window straddling the adoption 
in negative interest rate regimes to alleviate concerns around confounding effects and omitted 
variable bias (Molyneux et al., 2019). We perform our analysis on banks from OECD countries 
because the OECD is comprised of a somewhat homogenous group of countries. We do not extend 
the sample further because the structure of the banking system in the OECD differs from that in 
non-OECD countries (Shehzad et al., 2009). Our sample includes only domestic banks because 
multinational banks may operate in countries with both negative (i.e., treatment group) and 
positive interest rates (i.e., control group), which would confound inferences. The restriction to 
only include domestic banks also avoids the greater heterogeneity that would result from including 
multinational banks. The inclusion of domestic only banks also alleviates concerns about the effect 
of country-by-country reporting (CbCR) for multinational banks in the European Union that began 
in 2014.11  
In compiling our sample, we select domestic banks at the highest level of consolidation 
using ownership data retrieved from the Orbis Bank Focus database. This database contains 
information on both public and private banks. A bank is classified as domestic if it does not have 
greater than 50% ownership of a foreign subsidiary. A bank is classified as the highest level if it 
 
10 Note, in our primary analysis we exclude U.S. bank observations. This is done because the number of observations 
from the U.S. would cause our control group to dwarf our treatment group. In additional analyses we reintroduce U.S. 
banks to the sample and observe broadly similar results. 
11 Although European Union domestic banks are also subject to CRD IV, CbCR does not provide incremental 
information about those single country banks.  




is not a controlled subsidiary or branch of other entities.12 In the Orbis Bank Focus database, we 
use the following items for identification: entity type, subsidiaries, shareholders, and ultimate 
owners. We denote a bank as the highest level in an organization if none of the items indicate that 
it is a controlled subsidiary or branch. As Orbis collects data from different sources, this approach 
allows us to reduce the potential sample bias resulting from fragmented information of specific 
items.13  
We also use the Orbis Bank Focus database to obtain financial information for the 
consolidated accounts of the banks in our sample. We drop central banks, multilateral 
governmental banks, and specialized governmental credit institutions from the sample. We further 
exclude banks that were inactive during the sample period. Finally, we drop all observations with 
missing data required to compile the test and control variables.  
Different countries adopt negative interest rate policies at different times. For the timeline 
of negative policy rate adoption, we rely on Jobst and Lin (2016) (See Appendix A for details). 
When any of the policy rates—overnight lending, open market operations, or deposit facility—fall 
below zero, it is considered as the introduction of a negative interest rate. For our difference-in-
difference research design, we assign 2015 as the pseudo adoption year for banks in countries 
without negative interest rate regimes. We select 2015 because the majority of negative policy 
 
12 This definition is consistent with Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga (2001):“foreign bank is defined as a bank that is at 
least 50 percent foreign-owned.” 
13  Orbis gathers data from more than 160 separate providers and hundreds of its own sources. See 
https://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/data/international/orbis 




adoption occurs in that year.14  As such, using this pseudo date provides a better balance for the 
control group.15  
Given our research design, we require at least one observation in the pre-adoption (i.e., 
pre-negative interest rate regime) period and one observation in the post-adoption (i.e., post-
negative interest rate regime) period. Therefore, we drop all observations that do not meet these 
criteria. We impose the minimum pre-adoption period observation and post-adoption period 
observation requirement because we are interested in the difference for a specific bank between 
the two periods. After our screening procedure, the final sample consists of 404 unique banks and 
2,227 bank-year observations in 30 countries.  
3.2. Primary Analysis, Difference-in-difference Test 
In our primary analyses, we use a difference-in-difference research design. The difference-
in-difference design lends itself to this setting since there are staggered adoption dates and, from 
the banks’ point of view, negative interest rates are generally regarded as an exogenous and 
unexpected shock (Ulate 2021). 
 We first exploit the staggered introduction of negative interest rates in different countries 
to compare the change in the tax planning of banks operating in countries with negative interest 
rate policies (i.e., treatment group) with the change in the tax planning of banks in other OECD 
countries (i.e., control group) using the following model. 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =   𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝑖𝑗𝑡                                      (1) 
 
14 In our primary analyses we exclude U.S. banks for several reasons i) our treatment banks are all in Europe and Asia, 
ii) including U.S. banks in the main analysis overwhelms the sample (there are 4 times as many U.S. observations 
than all other OECD country observations combined). In supplemental analysis, we confirm inferences hold when 
including U.S. banks. 
15 In untabulated tests, we assign 2014 as the pseudo adoption year and repeat all the relevant tests, inferences remain 
unchanged.  




The dependent variable, ETR, is our proxy for tax planning.16 This variable is measured as 
the tax expense over the pre-tax income of bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡. We reset extreme values of ETR, or 
those below 0 or above 1, to 0 and 1 respectively.  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 is an indicator variable that is set equal 
to one if bank 𝑖 is in country 𝑗 where a negative interest rate is adopted, and zero otherwise.17 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is an indicator variable that is set equal to one for all years, including the introduction year, 
when a negative interest rate is adopted in the firms’ operating country, and zero otherwise. The 
coefficient of interest, 𝛽1, represents the relative change in tax planning, proxied by  ETR, between 
the banks that are subject to, and the banks that are not subject to, a negative interest rate regime.  
In addition to the primary variables of interest, we also include control variables for other 
time-varying bank characteristics that may influence bank tax planning (𝑋𝑖,𝑡). At the bank level, 
we follow prior literature, namely Overesch and Wolff (2021), and include control measures of 
bank size (log of total assets),  profitability (ROAE), and equity ratio (the ratio of equity to total 
assets). The first two control variables relate to the potential (i.e., size) and incentive (i.e., 
profitability) for tax planning while the equity ratio controls for capital structure. Liquidity risk is 
controlled for using the ratio of liquid assets over total assets and cost efficiency is controlled for 
using the cost to income ratio (i.e., the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income). In 
some specifications, additional controls for banks’ business models are used, including Non-
interest Income Ratio, Fees & Commissions Ratio, Interest Income Ratio, Interest Expenses Ratio 
 
16 Alternative measures of tax burden, such as current tax expense and cash taxes paid are not available in a machine-
readable format for our sample of banks. 
17 We use an indicator variable, as opposed to a continuous measure of central bank interest rates, for several reasons. 
First, as discussed in section 2, our hypothesized relation is based on the introduction of a negative interest rate regime 
(i.e., a cost outflow from banks to central banks). We do not expect our hypothesized relation to be linear in central 
bank rates, a fact we exploit in a falsification test in section 4. Second, a binary treatment variable allows for greater 
ease of interpretation of the interaction term in our difference-in-difference research design.   




and Net Interest Margin, which all capture components of bank profitability. All bank-level 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the effect of outliers on our analyses.  
At the country level, our model includes control variables for the statutory tax rate (STR) 
and the macroeconomic environment, namely GDP Growth, and Inflation (measured using the 
consumer price index). GDP Growth is included as it affects bank profitability through supply and 
demand of funds (Molyneux et al., 2019). Inflation is included as a control given that inflation 
impacts the operating costs of banks (Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2010) and investors require a 
nominal return (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001). Country-specific controls are taken from 
KPMG’s tax handbooks and World Bank databases. Detailed variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix C. 
In addition to the country and bank characteristics discussed above, our regression models 
also include indicator variables to capture bank fixed effects (𝜇𝑖) to absorb unobservable time-
invariant bank characteristics, and year fixed effects (𝜃𝑡), in order to control for common time 
effects. By using a research design with extensive fixed effects, we exploit within-firm variation 
to identify the effect of a negative interest rate regime on tax planning. 
4. Primary Empirical Analyses 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the sample composition. As presented in Panel A, 2011 and 2012 have 
relatively fewer observations but the number of observations per year stabilizes to be between 340-
400 banks beginning in 2013. Regarding the sample composition by country, Japan ranks first 
(26.76%), followed by France (9.56%) and Norway (6.06%). Together, banks in the European 
Union comprise 38.12% of the sample. For the control group, Canada has the highest number of 
observations (15.27%), followed by the United Kingdom (6.29%) and Australia (5.43%). 




Regarding bank specification, commercial banks and cooperative banks comprise most of the 
sample at 33.88% and 21.96% respectively.  
<insert Table 1 here> 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the test and control variables. Panel A displays 
the descriptive statistics of the pooled sample while Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of 
the treatment and control group before and after the introduction of the negative interest rate 
regime. The mean (median) GAAP ETR for the pooled sample is 28.00% (26.81%). For banks in 
the treatment group, the mean ETR is lower in the post-negative interest rate period (27.81%) than 
in the pre-negative interest rate period (33.24%). At the same time, the mean ETR for banks in the 
control group stays nearly the same at around 23%.  
Panel C separately presents the descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups 
across key variables. Banks in the treatment group are, on average, larger, less profitable, less 
liquid, and have lower equity ratios. We note some changes in bank characteristics after the 
introduction of negative interest rate policies in Panel B. Banks in the treatment group experience 
an increase in ROAE after the introduction of negative interest rates with the mean (median) 
increasing from 5.85% (4.90%) to 6.44% (5.59%), while banks in the control group exhibit a slight 
decrease from 9.22% (7.7%) to 8.91% (7.34%). One potential explanation for this is that the 
introduction of negative interest rates causes a change in the business model of treated banks. This 
is consistent with the findings of Heider et al. (2019). While we do not observe a clear pattern of 
a change in the Net Interest Margin, we note an increasing trend in non-interest-orientated income. 
More specifically, the mean (median) of Net Interest Margin for the treatment group increased 
(decreased) from 1.63% (1.51%) to 1.73% (1.49%) after the introduction of negative interest rate 




regimes; while the mean (median) for the control group decreased (increased) from 2.59% (1.89%) 
to 2.53% (1.92%).  
In regard to the other components of profitability, while the measure of Non-interest 
Income Ratio remained relatively constant for control banks, we note a substantial increase for 
treated banks as the mean (median) increased from 32.57% (28.73%) to 41.23% (40.84%). We 
also observe an increase in the Fees & Commissions Ratio for treated banks. These trends are 
consistent with Lopez et al. (2020) and Basten and Mariathasan (2018) and indicate that banks 
respond to negative interest rates by adjusting other aspects of their business. Statistics also reveal 
an average increase in the Equity Ratio for treated banks, with the mean (median) increasing from 
9.11% (6.12%) to 11.61% (8.78%), but not for the control group which stays at approximately the 
same level.  
Panel D presents Pearson correlations among the primary variables. Univariate evidence 
documents that GAAP ETR is positively related to Size, Cost-to-income Ratio and STR, and 
negatively related to ROAE, Equity Ratio, Liquidity Ratio, GDP Growth and Inflation.  
<insert Table 2 here> 
4.2 Primary Empirical Results, Staggered Difference-in-difference 
We start the multivariate analysis by running baseline regressions using a staggered 
difference-in-difference specification. Table 3 presents the results using the full sample. We are 
primarily interested in the coefficient on Treat*Post, which represents the average difference in 
the change of GAAP ETRs between banks subject to and not subject to the implementation of a 
negative interest rate regime. A negative and statistically significant coefficient on Treat*Post 
suggests that, relative to banks in the control group, treated banks increase tax planning after the 
adoption of negative interest rates.  




In Table 3 columns (1) and (2), banks’ Size and Profitability are included in the regression 
model to control for the possibilities and pressure of tax planning, and the equity ratio is included 
to control for capital structure. We also include the ratio of liquid assets to control for liquidity 
risk, and the cost to income ratio to control for cost efficiency. At the country level, statutory tax 
rate (STR), GDP Growth, and Inflation are included as control variables. Column (3) and (4) add 
additional controls regarding banks’ business models, including Non-interest Income Ratio, Fees 
& Commissions Ratio, Interest Income Ratio, Interest Expenses Ratio and Net Interest Margin. 
Due to data availability, the addition of these controls results in a reduced sample. To address 
concerns about the impact of the denominator in measuring tax planning for the dependent variable, 
Column (2) and (4) additionally employ the variable One over Pre-tax Profit (Edwards et al., 2020). 
Among these variables, Size shows a positive correlation with ETR, compared to a negative 
correlation with ROAE and Cost-to-income. Our interpretation is that smaller banks, more 
profitable banks, and less cost-efficient domestic banks have a greater incentive to engage in tax 
planning. 
The coefficient of interest, Treat*Post is negative and significant at the 5% level in 
columns (1) and (2) and at the 10% level in columns (3) and (4). Our primary analysis provides 
evidence consistent with the introduction of a negative interest rate being associated with an 
approximate 2.3 to 2.6 percentage point decrease in GAAP ETR. For the economic significance 
of this result, we provide an example within the context of the Eurozone. According to the FinTech 
company Deposit Solutions, the amount that banks paid for negative interest rates in the Eurozone 
was equal to 4% of pre-tax profit in 2018.18 Thus, the magnitude of GAAP ETR decreases in 
response to negative interest rate policies is economically meaningful.  
 
18 The  4% is calculated, using data from the European Central Bank, as total deposit charges for Eurozone banks 
divided by pre-tax profits before excess liquidity charges. The following items were used for this calculation: excess 




<insert Table 3 here> 
4.3 Robustness Tests and Additional Analyses 
4.3.1 Alternative Control Samples 
One possible concern with our primary analysis is that our findings could potentially be 
influenced by some of our sample selection choices. This subsection presents evidence that both 
our results and inferences are robust to a number of alternative sample selection choices.  
First, as noted in Section 3.1, our primary analysis excludes observations of U.S. banks. In 
our first robustness test we include U.S. banks in the sample and repeat the main analysis. Table 4 
columns (1) and (2) report results using this expanded sample. When including U.S. banks, the 
coefficients on Treat*Post are even more negative and significant as compared to our baseline 
specification. With this broader control sample, we observe a 4 percentage point decrease in GAAP 
ETR for treated banks relative to control banks, with coefficients that are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. 
We next repeat the main analysis but exclude Japanese banks because Japan underwent a 
tax reform in 2016 (EY, 2016; PwC, 2016) which could confound the test. Results are presented 
in columns (3) and (4). The results are robust with the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficients consistent with those reported in the main analysis in Table 3. These results also 
provide some comfort that our results are not driven by a specific country given that Japanese 
banks represent the largest percentage of observations in our sample (26.76%). 
Next, we limit the sample to the global ultimate owners and exclude banks classified as an 
“independent company” or “single location”. As reported in columns (5) and (6), the coefficients 
 
liquidity volumes, deposit rates, interest on excess liquidity, and banking profitability. Deposit balances with central 
banks that are not charged to banks were not taken into account. https://www.deposit-solutions.com/pressemitteilung/ 




on Treat*Post remain negative and statistically significant with this specification. For global 
ultimate owners, treated banks relative to control banks, are associated with a roughly 3 percentage 
point decrease in GAAP ETR following the introduction of negative interest rates. This observed 
effect is slightly larger than the effect observed in the full sample (Table 3).  
The date that a central bank implements negative interest rates might not coincide perfectly 
with a bank’s fiscal year-end since banks have different closing dates for their financial periods 
such that some year-ends are before the implementation date and some are after. Additionally, 
banks may not have the time nor the ability to adjust their tax planning immediately. As such, we 
would expect the results to be stronger if we allow for the treated banks to have more time to react 
to the negative interest rate regime. Therefore, we exclude the implementation year for each 
country from the sample and repeat our primary analysis. Results using this sample are presented 
in columns (7) and (8). In line with our prediction, the coefficients on Treat*Post stay significant 
at the 1% level and become more negative than in the baseline specification presented in Table 3. 
Although bank fixed effects absorb the influence of time-invariant bank characteristics, it 
is possible that some bank-specific tax planning items change over time. In column (9), we include 
additional bank-level control variables as a further robustness test. Previous literature suggests that 
loan loss provisions can be involved in tax planning (Beatty et al., 1995, Scholes et al., 1990), and 
off-balance sheet items, like contingent claims, have tax effects. Therefore, we add Credit Risk 
(the ratio of loan loss provisions on total assets) and Off-balance Sheet Ratio (the ratio of off-
balance sheet items on total assets) in the regression. We set Credit Risk to zero if data is missing 
or negative and set Off-balance Sheet Ratio to zero if missing.19 With the additional control 
 
19 We do not include these controls in the main specification as this information is missing for a substantial number 
of our sample observations, reducing the sample size. 




variables, the coefficient remains negative and significant (at the 1% level) with a comparable 
magnitude to our primary results in Table 3.  
<insert Table 4 here> 
4.3.2 Event-based Difference-in-difference 
To address the potential drawbacks of a staggered difference-in-difference design, as an 
additional robustness test, we align the event time of negative interest rate regime adoptions for 
our sample. This has several advantages. First, this alignment enables us to assess the parallel trend 
assumption before treatment. Second, staggered difference-in-difference tests may have a biased 
average effect because of the maturation differences between both groups over time. Our event-
based difference-in-difference design follows Cengiz et al. (2019) and focuses on the short-term 
effect around the adoption of negative interest rate policies. By stacking and aligning different 
treatment events in event-time, the test becomes similar to a setting with a contemporaneous 
treatment.  
Figure 1 plots the mean of the difference between the statutory tax rate and the GAAP ETR 
for the treatment and control groups over event-time. Banks in the treatment and control groups 
appear to satisfy the parallel trends assumption before the adoption. On average, the difference 
between the statutory tax rate and ETR in the treatment group is smaller than the difference in the 
control group in the pre-negative interest rate period. However, the difference between the rates is 
higher for treatment firms in the year after the implementation of negative interest rates, before 
falling to a similar level two years later. As explained earlier, the effect in the implementation year 
may be confounded. In this figure, we observe that the biggest effect occurs one year after the 
adoption.  




We employ our next battery of robustness tests using an event-based difference-in-
difference design with an aligned event period. Our sample period starts with three years before 
the introduction of a negative interest rate regime and ends with three years after the introduction 
of the negative interest rate regime (i.e., 7 years in total).20 For banks in countries without a 
negative interest rate regime, we assign 2015 as the pseudo policy year.21 Table 5 columns (1) and 
(2) present the results of our aligned difference-in-difference test. Importantly, our coefficient of 
interest, Treat*Post is negative and significant at the 10% level. The magnitude (2.1 percentage 
points to 2.2 percentage points) is similar, although slightly smaller than, our primary findings (2.3 
percentage points to 2.6 percentage points). 
Next, to address potential concerns that banks in the treatment group and the control group 
might not be comparable, we re-estimate our difference-in-difference model using matched pairs 
of treatment and control banks. To do this analysis, we use a probit model to estimate a propensity 
score of treatment assignment based on size, profitability (ROAE), equity ratio, and liquidity of 
the banks in the year before the negative interest rate regime adoption. To match the treated banks 
with suitable banks in the control group, we perform 1:1 nearest neighbor matching without 
replacement. Intuitively, we create matched pairs by identifying a bank in the control group that is 
similar with respect to the above-mentioned characteristics to a bank in the treatment group. Given 
that we have more banks in the treatment group than in the control group in the main sample, we 
allow for U.S. banks to serve as control banks in the matching pairs. The results using this 
propensity score matched sample are presented in Table 5 columns (3) and (4). Consistent with 
the results obtained using our primary sample, we report a negative and significant coefficient on 
 
20 Note that for Japanese banks, we do not have observations in the third year after the adoption due to data availability 
(i.e., the event occurred later in Japan than in other treatment countries). 
21 As previously stated, in robustness tests, inferences remain unchanged when using 2014 as an alternative pseudo 
adoption year. 




the interaction term Treat*Post. The magnitude of the effect is similar to the magnitude observed 
in our main analyses.  
<insert Table 5 here> 
4.3.3 Falsification test 
To further strengthen inferences from our findings, we next perform a falsification test to 
mitigate concerns that our findings may be an artifact of our research design. If our tests represent 
casual evidence of the effect of a negative interest rate, we should not find significant results when 
using an arbitrary cut-off rate. We conduct this falsification test by setting the cut-off rate at 0.05% 
rather than interest rates below zero. This cut-off point is close to the zero threshold we study, 
which should occur under broadly similar (although likely less severe) economic conditions. 
Selection of this cut-off rate allows us to implement the same difference-in-difference research 
design without any reversals of the pseudo treatment.22 
The results of this test are reported in Table 6. In this falsification analysis, the coefficient 
on Treat*Post is not significantly different than zero using the incorrect cut-off rate. This is 
consistent with expectations and provides added evidence that adoption of negative interest rates 
affects banks’ corporate tax behavior. 
<insert Table 6 here> 
5. Supplemental Analyses 
5.1. Cross-sectional variation: Low vs. High Distance to Insolvency Banks 
It is possible that some banks may be more acutely impacted by the imposition of negative 
interest rate policies than others. We examine this possibility using a number of different bank 
 
22 We set the falsification cut-off rate at 0.05% because otherwise one of our sample countries, the Czech Republic, 
goes below the cut-off point in 2012 and reverses in 2016.  




characteristics where variation would be predictable. These tests add context to our primary 
findings and provide additional confirmatory evidence of our results using an additional source of 
identification.  
We first investigate the impact of bank financial constraints. Prior research has documented 
that financially constrained firms are more likely to employ alternative funding sources like tax 
savings (Edwards et al., 2016). Following the adoption of negative interest rate policies, we expect 
that more financially constrained banks will increase their tax planning more than less-constrained 
banks in order to generate cash flow.  
To capture bank financial constraints, we use a measure of bank distance to insolvency. 
Following Schepens (2016), the distance to insolvency score is calculated as the sum of return on 
assets and the equity ratio, over the standard deviation of the returns in pre-negative interest rate 
years.23 A high distance to insolvency score indicates that there is more room for returns to fall 
before equity becomes negative and is thus an indication for stability. We split the sample into two 
subgroups based on the median distance to insolvency score per country in the year before the 
introduction of a negative interest rate regime. We split the sample by country because countries 
adopt the regime at different times and the rates implemented can vary; thereby indicating that 
banks in different countries are affected differently. Splitting the sample by country also mitigates 
concerns that the results are driven by certain countries or specific country characteristics. We split 
bank observations in the control group together with the treatment group, and use the values of 
2014 reserves as the partition.24  
 
23 Some prior literature label the measure as the Z-score, see Houston et al. (2010), Laeven & Levine (2009), and 
Schepens (2016). We use the term “Distance to Insolvency” to avoid confusion with the Altman (1968) Z-score, a 
commonly used default risk measure outside of financial institutions. 
24 For this analysis, we exclude observations from countries with only a single bank in the sample. This restriction 
removes Israel, Iceland, Latvia, Netherlands, and Poland. 




Table 7 columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficient capturing the effect of a negative 
interest rate is only significant when banks have a low distance to insolvency. Columns (3) and (4) 
further show that only the low distance to insolvency group of banks display negative and 
significant coefficients.25 
Overall, in line with our expectations, the effect of a negative interest rate on GAAP ETR 
is more pronounced in banks that are closer to insolvency.  
<insert Table 7 here> 
5.2. Cross-sectional variation: Low vs. High Reserve Banks  
We further investigate whether the effect of a negative interest rate on tax planning is 
different conditional on the level of bank reserves. On one hand, less capitalized banks with lower 
reserves are more likely to face financial difficulties. Conversely, banks holding high excessive 
reserves face a higher de-facto tax with the introduction of negative interest rates. One would 
expect that banks may seek to offset the additional payments to the government by reducing their 
income tax payments (i.e., a substitution effect). 
We explore the cross-sectional variation in banks that hold different levels of reserves as 
measured by cash at the central bank scaled by total assets.26 Again, we split the sample into two 
subgroups based on the median value of banks’ Cash at Central Bank per country in the year 
before the introduction of the negative rate regime.27 Table 8 presents the results with the treatment 
group compared to the partitioned control group.  
 
25 Note, the difference in the coefficients between the two subgroups in column (1) and (3) is statistically significant 
at traditional levels (Prob > F = 0.0386). The difference in the coefficients between the two groups in column (3) and 
(4) is significant at traditional levels (Prob > F = 0.0260). 
26 We do not use Tier 1 capital ratio because it is likely to be driven by risk-weighted assets, the denominator, not only 
capital level.  See  Gropp et al. (2019)  and Mariathasan & Merrouche (2014). Also, Tier 1 capital includes deferred 
tax assets.  
27 Again, we exclude countries with only one bank in the sample for this split analysis. This restriction removes Estonia, 
Israel, Iceland, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. 




Our results from this test are consistent with our primary effect being concentrated in the 
subsample of banks that have low reserves. In this subsample, the coefficients on Treat*Post are 
negative and significant at the 1% level and are stronger than our baseline results in Table 3. We 
do not find evidence of a negative interest rate regime’s influence in the subgroup of banks with 
high reserves.28 Our interpretation of this result is that banks with lower reserves at central banks 
are more likely to face financial difficulties, and are thus more likely to increase tax planning to 
offset the negative interest charges faced after the introduction of a negative interest rate regime.  
<insert Table 8 here> 
5.3. Cross-sectional variation: Low vs. High Tax Enforcement 
The observed tax substitution effect should also vary based on the level of enforcement on 
corporate income tax. Banks in low enforcement environments should be better able to increase 
their income tax avoidance in response to the implementation of a negative interest rate regime. 
Accordingly, we investigate the cross-sectional variation in our hypothesized relation with respect 
to a country’s enforcement level. 
We follow De Simone et al. (2019) and measure Enforcement using tax enforcement 
spending in a country as a percentage of GDP. This measure captures the amount of financial 
resources allocated to income tax enforcement efforts in the country. A non-trivial portion of 
enforcement is allocated to corporate taxpayers. 
We partition the sample based on the median value of Enforcement in 2011, the first year 
of our sample period.29 Table 9 presents the results of the regressions for the two subsamples with 
low and high levels of tax enforcement, respectively. Our results are consistent with the increase 
 
28 Note, the differences in the coefficients between the two subgroups are not statistically significant at traditional 
levels (Prob > F = 0.3090, Prob > F =0.1822 respectively). 
29 Again, we exclude countries with only one bank in the sample for this split analysis. This restriction removes Estonia, 
Israel, Iceland, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. 




in tax avoidance following the implementation of negative interest rate regimes being concentrated 
in countries where the level of tax enforcement is low. In this subsample, the coefficients on 
Treat*Post are negative and significant at the 1% level. Conversely, we do not observe a 
significant coefficient on Treat*Post when the level of tax enforcement is high.30 We interpret 
these results as consistent with the notion that the tax substitution effect is stronger when tax 
enforcement is low.  
<insert Table 9 here> 
5.4. Cross-sectional variation: Low vs. High Trust in Government 
Next, we examine whether the documented tax substitution effect is larger in countries with 
low trust in government. Trust in government describes whether individuals and social groups 
believe that the government is fair and working for the common good. The tax psychology 
literature indicates that low levels of trust in the government impair the taxpayer’s willingness to 
pay taxes (Kirchler et al., 2008). 
We follow  Mendoza et al. (2017) and measure Trust based on the average of two measures. 
The two measures are the transparency of government policy, and whether government decisions 
are effectively implemented. The data represents business executives’ perceptions in a certain 
country, as collected by the Institute for Management & Development World Competitiveness 
Yearbook (WCY) and made available by the World Bank.31  
We split the sample based on the median value of Trust in 2011. The results are presented 
in Table 10. While the coefficients on Treat*Post are negative (around -0.08) and significant at 
the 1% level in the low government trust group, we do not observe significant effects in the high 
 
30 Note, the differences in the coefficients between the two subgroups are not statistically significant at traditional 
levels (Prob > F =   0.1969, Prob > F =0.3494 respectively). 
31 See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents#wgiDataSources. 




government trust group. 32  These results indicate that the increase in tax planning is more 
pronounced in countries with low levels of trust in the government as proxied by perceptions of 
effectiveness and transparency of government policy. 
<insert Table 10 here> 
6. Conclusion 
Central banks introduce negative interest rates to encourage lending and to stimulate the 
economy. By imposing a charge on excess bank reserves, negative interest rates serve as a de-facto 
tax levied on excess liquidity. In this paper, we examine whether this new “tax” (i.e., negative 
interest rates) affects corporate tax planning.  
The trend towards using negative interest rates as a monetary policy instrument is 
becoming increasingly more prevalent. Using a difference-in-difference research design with 
bank- and time-fixed effects, we find that banks increase their tax planning in response to negative 
interest rates. After the implementation of a negative interest rate regime, affected banks have a 
2.3 to 2.6 percentage point decrease in their GAAP ETR relative to unaffected banks. Further tests 
reveal that this effect is stronger for financially constrained banks (i.e., banks closer to insolvency 
and banks with lower reserves), banks in low enforcement environments, and banks in countries 
with low levels of trust in government.  
By showing the effect of negative interest rates on corporate tax behavior, we contribute to 
the debate on the consequences of negative interest rates. Additionally, we add to the literature on 
banks’ tax planning behaviors by showing that banks adjust their behavior in response to changes 
in monetary policy.  
 
32 Note, the differences in the coefficients between the two subgroups are not statistically significant at traditional 
levels (Prob > F = 0.1007, Prob > F =0.1447 respectively). 




The findings of our study are potentially of interest to policymakers. We provide evidence 
that could be relevant when central banks consider the implementation of negative interest rates. 
Given the current environment of persistently low interest rates, many countries may consider the 
adoption of this monetary tool. By showing the spillover effect of this monetary policy on 
corporate taxes, we add to the on-going discussion regarding the consequences of negative interest 
rates. 
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Appendix A: Timeline of Central Bank Negative Interest Rates 
Country 
Time of introduction Instrument Objective 
Demark July. 6, 2012-April. 24, 
2014 and Sept. 05, 2014 
One week certificate of 
deposit rate 
Countering safe-haven inflows and 
exchange rate pressures (continued 
FX interventions) 
Euro Area June. 11, 2014 ECB’s deposit facility rate Price stability and anchoring 
inflation expectations (together 
with asset purchase program) 
Japan  Feb. 16, 2016 policy rate balance, the 
residual reserve deposit 
Price stability and anchoring 
inflation expectations (together 
with asset purchase program) 
Norway  Sept. 24, 2015 Reserve rate Price stability 
Sweden  Feb. 18, 2015 One week repo rate Price stability and anchoring 
inflation expectations (together 
with asset purchase program) 
Switzerland  Jan. 15, 2015 Overnight sight deposit rate Reducing appreciation and 
deflationary pressures 
Source: Jobst and Lin (2016) 
This table presents the timeline of the introduction of negative interest rates. Negative interest rates are identified using Central Bank 
policy interest rate. Specifically, we use the overnight deposit facility rate from the European Central Bank; the cash rate target from 
the Reserve Bank of Australia; the target for the overnight rate from the Bank of Canada; the interest rate for the permanent deposit 
facility from the Central Bank of Chile (Banco Central de Chile); the two-week repo rate from the Czech National Bank; the one week 
certificate of deposit rate from the Danmarks Nationalbank (Nationalbanken); the simple average of the current account rate, and the 
maximum rate on 28-day certificates of deposit before 2014 and the seven-day term deposit rate after May 21, 2014 from the Central 
Bank of Iceland; the target rate of the central bank from the Bank of Israel; the complementary deposit facility (policy rate balance after 
February 16, 2016) from the Bank of Japan; the interest rate target for the overnight rate from the Bank of Mexico; the official cash rate 
from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand; the reserve rate from the Norges Bank; the deposit rate from the National Bank of Poland; the 
deposit rate from the Bank of Korea; the one week repo rate from the Sveriges Riksbank; the overnight sight deposit rate from the Swiss 
National Bank; the one week repo rate from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey; the official bank rate IUDBEDR (base rate) 








Appendix B Distribution of Central Bank Policy Rates   
 






















Appendix C Variable Definitions and Construction 
Variable Definitions Source 
Firm level 
ETR Tax expense scaled by pre-tax income 
Bureau van Dijk 
Bank Focus 
Treat 
An indicator variable that equals one if the bank is in the country where 
a negative interest rate is adopted, and zero otherwise.  
Appendix A 
Post 
An indicator that equal to one for years during and after a negative 
interest rate is adopted, and zero otherwise. 
Appendix A 
Size The natural logarithm of bank total assets 
Bureau van Dijk 
Bank Focus 
ROAE Return on average equity 
Bureau van Dijk 
Bank Focus 
Equity Ratio The ratio of bank equity on total assets 
Bureau van Dijk 
Bank Focus 
Liquidity Ratio The ratio of bank liquid assets on total assets 




The ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. 




The ratio of non-interest income on operating revenues 




The ratio of fees and commissions income to total assets 




The ratio of interest income on total assets 




The ratio of interest expenses on total assets 
Bureau van Dijk 
Bank Focus 
Net Interest Margin 
The difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing 
liabilities divided by the amount of interest earning assets 
Bureau van Dijk 
Bank Focus 
One over Pretax 
Profit 
One over pre-tax income 
Bureau van Dijk 
Bank Focus 
Credit Risk Ratio 
The ratio of loan loss provisions on total assets. It is set to 0 for negative 
and missing values. 




The ratio of off-balance sheet items on total assets.  It is set to 0 for 
missing values. 
Bureau van Dijk 
Bank Focus 
Cash at Central 
Bank 
Cash and balances at central bank scaled by total assets 




The sum of return on assets and the equity ratio over the standard 
deviation of the returns 
Bureau van Dijk 
Bank Focus 
Country level 
STR The average statutory corporate income tax rate in the country KPMG 
GDP Growth The annual percentage growth rate of GDP World Bank 
Inflation The yearly consumer price index in percentage World Bank 
Enforcement 







The average of two measures: business executives’ perceptions of government 








Figure 1 Difference between the STR and the GAAP ETR over Time 
 
This figure displays the average difference between statutory tax rate and GAAP ETR for the treatment group and control group over 
time. We do not display the third year after the adoption because Japan does not have data for that year. As Japanese banks make up a 
significant proportion of our treated sample, the plots are not representative for that year.  




Table 1 Sample Descriptive 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year 
 
year Treat*Post=0 Treat*Post=1 Total Observations Percent 
2011 180 0 180 8.08 
2012 200 5 205 9.21 
2013 337 4 346 15.31 
2014 272 117 398 17.47 
2015 237 149 395 17.33 
2016 142 233 384 16.84 
2017 135 216 359 15.76 
Total 1,503 724 2,227 100 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Country 
Country Name Observations Percent 
Negative Interest Rate 
Regime 
AUSTRALIA 121 5.43  
AUSTRIA 23 1.03 yes 
BELGIUM 26 1.17 yes 
CANADA 340 15.27  
CHILE 19 0.85  
CZECH REPUBLIC 9 0.4  
DENMARK 32 1.44 yes 
ESTONIA 5 0.22 yes 
FINLAND 50 2.25 yes 
FRANCE 213 9.56 yes 
GERMANY 117 5.25 yes 
ICELAND 7 0.31  
ISRAEL 5 0.22  
ITALY 78 3.5 yes 
JAPAN 596 26.76 yes 
LATVIA 6 0.27 yes 
LUXEMBOURG 11 0.49 yes 
MEXICO 52 2.33  
NETHERLANDS 15 0.67 yes 
NEW ZEALAND 8 0.36  
NORWAY 135 6.06 yes 
POLAND 10 0.45  
PORTUGAL 10 0.45 yes 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 47 2.11  
SLOVAKIA 5 0.22 yes 
SPAIN 59 2.65 yes 
SWEDEN 40 1.8 yes 
SWITZERLAND 21 0.94 yes 
TURKEY 27 1.21  
UNITED KINGDOM 140 6.29  
Total 2,227 100   




Panel C: Sample Distribution by Bank Specialization 
Specialization Freq. Percent 
Bank holdings & Holding companies 196 8.8 
Commercial banks 754 33.86 
Cooperative banks 489 21.96 
Finance companies 97 4.36 
Investment & Trust corporations 125 5.61 
Investment banks 47 2.11 
Other non banking credit institutions 6 0.27 
Private banking / Asset management companies 28 1.26 
Real Estate & Mortgage banks 219 9.83 
Savings banks 238 10.69 
Securities firms 28 1.26 
Total 2,227 100 
 
This table shows the composition of our sample banks. Sample A, B, C describes the sample distribution by year, country and bank 
specialization respectively. 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Pooled Sample 
  Count Mean SD Min Max p25 p50 p75 
ETR 2,227 28.00% 15.00% 0.00% 100.00% 21.00% 27.00% 34.00% 
Size 2,227 15.93 2.91 8.44 24.48 14.27 15.83 17.06 
ROAE 2,227 7.17% 5.50% 0.20% 32.79% 3.87% 5.66% 8.89% 
Equity Ratio 2,227 13.30% 19.01% 2.94% 99.21% 5.49% 7.47% 11.77% 
Liquidity Ratio 2,227 18.62% 21.96% 0.47% 99.38% 5.16% 10.05% 21.36% 
Cost-to-income Ratio 2,227 65.87% 17.99% 3.07% 98.75% 55.98% 68.53% 78.69% 
Non-interest Income Ratio 2,142 34.48% 28.03% -181.13% 147.58% 18.09% 31.39% 47.16% 
Fees & Commissions Ratio 2,142 2.08% 7.37% 0.00% 61.59% 0.23% 0.42% 1.10% 
Interest Income Ratio 2,142 2.89% 2.29% 0.36% 15.96% 1.38% 2.56% 3.55% 
Interest Expenses Ratio 2,142 1.14% 1.08% 0.00% 4.88% 0.13% 1.00% 1.76% 
Net Interest Margin 2,142 1.98% 1.86% 0.12% 14.21% 1.24% 1.57% 2.06% 
One over Pretax Profit 2,227 3.20E-04 1.55E-03 0.00E+00 1.33E-02 1.00E-05 2.00E-05 8.00E-05 
STR 2,227 29.13% 5.40% 15.00% 40.69% 26.00% 29.79% 33.33% 
GDP Growth 2,227 1.69 1.23 -2.98 8.49 0.96 1.79 2.36 
Inflation 2,227 1.32 1.35 -1.14 11.14 0.37 1.11 1.95 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the pooled sample. The sample for ETR , Size, ROAE, Equity Ratio, Liquidity Ratio, Cost-to-income Ratio, One over 
Pretax Profit, STR, GDP Growth, Inflation comprises 2227 observations of 404 banks from 2011 to 2017. The sample for Non-interest Income Ratio, Fees & 
Commissions Ratio, Interest Income Ratio, Interest Expenses Ratio, Net Interest Margin comprises 2142 observations of 385 banks from 2011 to 2017. ETR is 
calculated as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of bank total assets. ROAE is the return on average equity. Equity 
Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of bank liquid assets on total assets. Cost-to-income Ratio is the ratio of operating 
expenses on net operating income. Non-interest Income Ratio is the ratio of non-interest income on operating revenues. Fees & Commissions Ratio is the ratio of 
fees and commissions income to total assets. Interest Income Ratio is the ratio of interest income on total assets. Interest Expenses Ratio is the ratio of interest 
expenses on total assets. Net Interest Margin is measured as the difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by the amount of 
interest earning assets. One over Pretax Profit is calculated as one over pre-tax income. STR is the average statutory corporate income tax rate in the country. GDP 
Growth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured as the yearly consumer price index in percentage. All variables are as defined 
in Appendix C. 




Panel B: Treatment v.s. Control Groups, Pre. v.s. Post-introduction of Negative Interest Rates (NIR) 
 Treatment Group pre-NIR Treatment Group post-NIR 
  Count Mean p50 SD Count Mean p50 SD 
ETR 718 33.24% 34.93% 16.66% 724 27.81% 27.99% 13.94% 
Size 718 16.79 16.62 2.64 724 16.26 16.09 2.67 
ROAE 718 5.85% 4.90% 4.32% 724 6.44% 5.39% 4.59% 
Equity Ratio 718 9.11% 6.12% 11.21% 724 11.61% 8.78% 12.94% 
Liquidity Ratio 718 15.63% 8.25% 17.51% 724 18.26% 10.71% 18.69% 
Cost-to-income Ratio 718 69.07% 71.06% 14.16% 724 67.00% 67.14% 15.63% 
Non-interest Income Ratio 706 32.57% 28.73% 21.51% 705 41.23% 40.84% 22.41% 
Fees & Commissions Ratio 706 1.28% 0.32% 4.40% 705 1.63% 0.65% 4.59% 
Interest Income Ratio 706 2.20% 1.59% 1.34% 705 2.24% 2.17% 1.31% 
Interest Expenses Ratio 706 0.76% 0.17% 0.88% 705 0.74% 0.57% 0.65% 
Net Interest Margin 706 1.63% 1.51% 0.86% 705 1.73% 1.49% 1.11% 
One over Pretax Profit 718 9.55E-05 1.35E-05 5.02E-04 724 1.27E-04 1.62E-05 5.46E-04 
STR 718 33.41% 33.86% 5.08% 724 28.75% 30.86% 4.31% 
GDP Growth 718 0.89 1.03 1.09 724 1.64 1.74 0.91 
Inflation 718 1.22 0.86 1.10 724 0.66 0.47 0.88 
 Control Group pre-NIR Control Group post-NIR 
  Count Mean p50 SD Count Mean p50 SD 
ETR 367 23.24% 24.78% 12.83% 418 23.49% 24.56% 11.79% 
Size 367 14.70 14.88 2.94 418 14.99 14.78 3.06 
ROAE 367 9.22% 7.70% 6.85% 418 8.91% 7.34% 6.41% 
Equity Ratio 367 19.25% 7.80% 27.69% 418 18.22% 7.97% 25.67% 
Liquidity Ratio 367 22.73% 10.90% 28.22% 418 20.78% 10.21% 26.61% 
Cost-to-income Ratio 367 61.20% 65.96% 21.78% 418 62.50% 67.95% 22.20% 
Non-interest Income Ratio 345 29.42% 22.60% 39.04% 386 30.20% 21.72% 33.33% 
Fees & Commissions Ratio 345 3.62% 0.37% 11.82% 386 2.96% 0.34% 9.93% 
Interest Income Ratio 345 4.43% 3.74% 3.14% 386 3.96% 3.30% 2.99% 
Interest Expenses Ratio 345 2.12% 2.09% 1.25% 386 1.70% 1.58% 1.07% 
Net Interest Margin 345 2.59% 1.89% 2.92% 386 2.53% 1.92% 2.67% 
One over Pretax Profit 367 8.16E-04 5.18E-05 2.70E-03 418 5.85E-04 5.15E-05 2.23E-03 
STR 367 25.82% 26.00% 3.19% 418 25.34% 26.50% 3.76% 
GDP Growth 367 2.70 2.58 1.05 418 2.25 2.36 1.14 
Inflation 367 2.31 1.91 1.45 418 1.79 1.43 1.60 
 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics of the treatment group and control before and after the introduction of NIR separately. For the treatment group, the sample for most 
variables comprises 718 (724) observations before (after) the introduction of NIR from 2011 to 2017.  For the control group, the sample for most variables comprises 367(418) 




observations before (after) the introduction of NIR from 2011 to 2017.  ETR is calculated as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. Size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of bank total assets. ROAE is the return on average equity. Equity Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of 
bank liquid assets on total assets. Cost-to-income Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. Non-interest Income Ratio is the ratio of non-
interest income on operating revenues. Fees & Commissions Ratio is the ratio of fees and commissions income to total assets. Interest Income Ratio is the ratio of 
interest income on total assets. Interest Expenses Ratio is the ratio of interest expenses on total assets. Net Interest Margin is measured as the difference between 
interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by the amount of interest earning assets. One over Pretax Profit is calculated as one over pre-tax income. 
STR is the average statutory corporate income tax rate in the country. GDP Growth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured as 
the yearly consumer price index in percentage. All variables are as defined in Appendix C. 




Panel C: Treatment v.s. Control Groups 
  Treatment Control 
  Count SD Min Max p50 Count SD Min Max p50 
ETR 1,442 15.59% 0.00% 100.00% 30.24% 785 12.28% 0.00% 100.00% 24.63% 
Size 1,442 2.67 8.44 24.48 16.28 785 3.01 8.44 24.48 14.8 
ROAE 1,442 4.47% 0.20% 32.79% 5.08% 785 6.62% 0.20% 32.79% 7.64% 
Equity Ratio 1,442 12.17% 2.94% 99.05% 7.15% 785 26.62% 2.94% 99.21% 7.90% 
Liquidity Ratio 1,442 18.15% 0.47% 99.38% 9.72% 785 27.38% 0.47% 99.38% 10.73% 
Cost-to-income Ratio 1,442 14.94% 3.07% 98.75% 69.12% 785 22.00% 3.07% 98.75% 67.11% 
Non-interest Income Ratio 1,411 22.38% -50.44% 105.88% 35.12% 731 36.12% -181.13% 147.58% 21.83% 
Fees & Commissions Ratio 1,411 4.50% 0.00% 61.59% 0.46% 731 10.86% 0.00% 61.59% 0.36% 
Interest Income Ratio 1,411 1.32% 0.36% 10.90% 1.81% 731 3.07% 0.36% 15.96% 3.53% 
Interest Expenses Ratio 1,411 0.77% 0.01% 4.59% 0.41% 731 1.18% 0.00% 4.88% 1.77% 
Net Interest Margin 1,411 0.99% 0.12% 8.12% 1.50% 731 2.79% 0.12% 14.21% 1.91% 
One over Pretax Profit 1,442 5.25E-04 7.44E-09 8.70E-03 1.45E-05 785 2.46E-03 7.44E-09 1.33E-02 5.18E-05 
STR 1,442 5.25% 15.00% 40.69% 30.86% 785 3.51% 18.50% 30.00% 26.50% 
GDP Growth 1,442 1.07 -2.98 5.75 1.22 785 1.12 -0.48 8.49 2.37 
Inflation 1,442 1.04 -1.14 3.55 0.56 785 1.55 -0.87 11.14 1.6 
 
  Treatment-Mean Control-Mean Difference    t-stat  
ETR 30.52% 23.37% 7.14% *** 11.89 
Size 16.52 14.85 1.67 *** 12.97 
ROAE 6.14% 9.06% -2.91% *** 11.04 
Equity Ratio 10.36% 18.70% -8.34% *** -8.32 
Liquidity Ratio 16.95% 21.69% -4.74% *** -4.36 
Cost-to-income Ratio 68.03% 61.89% 6.14% *** 6.99 
Non-interest Income Ratio 36.89% 29.83% 7.06% *** -4.83 
Fees & Commissions Ratio 1.45% 3.27% -1.82% *** -4.34 
Interest Income Ratio 2.22% 4.18% -1.96% *** -16.49 
Interest Expenses Ratio 0.75% 1.90% -1.15% *** -23.87 
Net Interest Margin 1.68% 2.56% -0.88% *** -8.23 
One over Pretax Profit 1.11E-04 6.93E-04 -5.82E-04 *** -6.54 
STR 31.07% 25.56% 5.50% *** 29.49 
GDP Growth 1.27 2.46 -1.19 *** -24.3 
Inflation  0.93 2.03 -1.1 *** -17.8 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics of the treatment group and the control group separately. The last two columns show differences between the mean and t-statistics.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. For the treatment (control) group, the sample for most variables comprises 1442 (785) observations 
from 2011 to 2017.  ETR is calculated as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of bank total assets. ROAE is the return on 




average equity. Equity Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of bank liquid assets on total assets. Cost-to-income Ratio 
is the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. Non-interest Income Ratio is the ratio of non-interest income on operating revenues. Fees & Commissions 
Ratio is the ratio of fees and commissions income to total assets. Interest Income Ratio is the ratio of interest income on total assets. Interest Expenses Ratio is the 
ratio of interest expenses on total assets. Net Interest Margin is measured as the difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by 
the amount of interest earning assets. One over Pretax Profit is calculated as one over pre-tax income. STR is the average statutory corporate income tax rate in the 
country. GDP Growth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured as the yearly consumer price index in percentage. All variables are 
as defined in Appendix C. 




Panel D: Correlation 










ETR 1.000    
Size 0.056* 1.000    
ROAE -0.310* -0.184* 1.000    
Equity Ratio -0.123* -0.413* 0.117* 1.000    
Liquidity Ratio -0.105* 0.018 0.083* 0.233* 1.000    
Cost-to-income Ratio 0.185* 0.058* -0.370* -0.163* -0.146* 1.000   
STR 0.338* 0.263* -0.291* -0.162* -0.110* 0.194* 1.000   
GDP Growth -0.236* -0.145* 0.245* 0.136* 0.055* -0.081* -0.418* 1.000  
Inflation -0.146* -0.218* 0.235* 0.171* 0.084* -0.129* -0.288* 0.302* 1.000 
Notes: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients in the lower diagonal. * indicates the correlation coefficients are significant at the .05 level or higher.  
ETR is calculated as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of bank total assets. ROAE is the return on 
average equity. Equity Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of bank liquid assets on total assets. Cost-
to-income Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. STR is the average statutory corporate income tax rate in the country. 
GDP Growth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured as the yearly consumer price index in percentage. All 











Table 3: Main Difference-in-Difference Regression  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ETR ETR ETR ETR 
          
Treat*Post -0.0258** -0.0258** -0.0230* -0.0231* 
 (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0120) 
Size 0.0482* 0.0481* 0.0533* 0.0534* 
 (0.0279) (0.0282) (0.0295) (0.0299) 
ROAE -1.186*** -1.187*** -1.297*** -1.295*** 
 (0.152) (0.147) (0.172) (0.168) 
Equity Ratio 0.492 0.493 0.468 0.466 
 (0.353) (0.352) (0.413) (0.414) 
Liquidity Ratio -0.0269 -0.0271 -0.0255 -0.0252 
 (0.0643) (0.0636) (0.0672) (0.0668) 
Cost-to-income Ratio -0.206*** -0.205*** -0.227*** -0.229*** 
 (0.0588) (0.0601) (0.0625) (0.0648) 
Non-interest Income Ratio   -0.0507 -0.0506 
   (0.0400) (0.0402) 
Fees & Commissions Ratio   0.973 0.971 
   (0.604) (0.603) 
Interest Income Ratio   -0.221 -0.220 
   (2.534) (2.539) 
Interest Expenses Ratio   0.700 0.707 
   (2.735) (2.739) 
Net Interest Margin   0.496 0.494 
   (2.069) (2.072) 
STR 0.433** 0.432** 0.424* 0.425* 
 (0.213) (0.214) (0.240) (0.241) 
GDP Growth -0.000582 -0.000583 -0.00174 -0.00174 
 (0.00279) (0.00279) (0.00282) (0.00282) 
Inflation 0.00563 0.00564 0.00593 0.00590 
 (0.00439) (0.00432) (0.00438) (0.00431) 
One over Pretax Profit  -0.505  1.416 
  (15.59)  (11.55) 
Constant -0.448 -0.447 -0.513 -0.515 
 (0.478) (0.482) (0.511) (0.516) 
     
Observations 2,227 2,227 2,142 2,142 
R-squared 0.155 0.155 0.166 0.166 
Number of banks 404 404 385 385 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
This table presents the results of our main test: a staggered difference-in-differences analysis on the full sample. We require banks to 
have at least one observation pre-adoption and one observation post-adoption (post-adoption starts 2015 for banks in the control group). 
We estimate the following model: 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =   𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                                       
The dependent variable is ETR measured as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. Treat*Post equals to one if (1) the bank is in the 
country with a negative interest rate policy (2) during and after a negative interest rate policy is adopted, and zero otherwise. Columns 
(1) and (2) controls for possibilities and pressure of tax planning, capital structure, risks and operating efficiency. Columns (3) and (4) 
add additional control variables regarding banks’ business models and risks.  Size is measured as the natural logarithm of bank total 
assets. ROAE is the return on average equity. Equity Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio 
of bank liquid assets on total assets. Cost-to-income Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. Non-interest 
Income Ratio is the ratio of non-interest income on operating revenues. Fees & Commissions Ratio is the ratio of fees and commissions 
income to total assets. Interest Income Ratio is the ratio of interest income on total assets. Interest Expenses Ratio is the ratio of interest 




expenses on total assets. Net Interest Margin is measured as the difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities 
divided by the amount of interest earning assets. One over Pretax Profit is calculated as one over pre-tax income. STR is the average 
statutory corporate income tax rate in the country. GDP Growth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Inflation is 
measured as the yearly consumer price index in percentage. ETRs are winsorized at 0 and 1. All other variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% level. All variables are as defined in Appendix C. The sample for columns (1) and (2) comprises 2227 observations of 404 
banks from 2011 to 2017. The sample for columns (3) and (4) comprises 2142 observations of 385 banks from 2011 to 2017. All 
regressions include bank fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.




Table 4: Robustness Tests: Alternative Control Samples 


















                    
Treat*Post  -0.0414*** -0.0392*** -0.0297** -0.0255* -0.0313** -0.0299* -0.0447*** -0.0416*** -0.0284*** 
(0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0109) 
Size 0.0238** 0.0318*** 0.0410 0.0545* 0.0457 0.0698** 0.0520* 0.0550* 0.0452 
(0.0102) (0.0110) (0.0299) (0.0322) (0.0317) (0.0343) (0.0311) (0.0324) (0.0275) 
ROAE -1.227*** -1.318*** -0.948*** -1.028*** -1.415*** -1.571*** -1.065*** -1.158*** -0.0141*** 
(0.0604) (0.0630) (0.170) (0.194) (0.182) (0.207) (0.157) (0.179) (0.00192) 
Equity Ratio -0.0589 -0.169 0.511 0.528 -0.0760 -0.318 0.595* 0.575 0.00438 
(0.220) (0.252) (0.345) (0.397) (0.245) (0.327) (0.325) (0.370) (0.00419) 
Liquidity Ratio -0.0608* -0.0403 0.000323 -0.0167 -0.0858 -0.0952 -0.0153 -0.0197 -0.000328 
(0.0329) (0.0331) (0.0732) (0.0770) (0.0829) (0.0880) (0.0768) (0.0813) (0.000670) 
Cost-to-income 
Ratio -0.496*** -0.479*** -0.127** -0.139** -0.224*** -0.282*** -0.189*** -0.219*** 
-
0.00281*** 
(0.0318) (0.0325) (0.0636) (0.0682) (0.0808) (0.0820) (0.0649) (0.0709) (0.000693) 
Non-interest 
Income Ratio 
 0.0246  -0.0502  -0.110  -0.0530 -0.000373 




 0.440*  0.961**  2.665***  1.201** 0.00946 
 (0.256)  (0.438)  (0.819)  (0.516) (0.00622) 
Interest Income 
Ratio 
 0.779  0.490  2.640  -1.579 0.00288 
 (0.912)  (2.440)  (3.047)  (2.785) (0.0258) 
Interest 
Expenses Ratio 
 -1.144  -0.212  -2.389  1.834 0.00463 
 (1.413)  (2.676)  (3.323)  (2.989) (0.0277) 
Net Interest 
Margin 
 2.064***  -0.138  -3.033  1.281 0.00619 
 (0.692)  (1.814)  (3.290)  (2.199) (0.0210) 
STR 0.813*** 0.772*** 0.696* 0.666* 0.236 0.177 0.580** 0.527** 0.413* 
(0.208) (0.224) (0.388) (0.391) (0.236) (0.286) (0.244) (0.261) (0.234) 
GDP Growth -0.00356 -0.00416 -0.00214 -0.00421 0.000468 -0.000644 0.00416 0.00278  
(0.00276) (0.00283) (0.00324) (0.00330) (0.00386) (0.00402) (0.00325) (0.00331)  
          




Inflation -0.000543 -5.13e-05 0.00724 0.00715 0.00616 0.00639 0.0106** 0.0109**  
(0.00334) (0.00334) (0.00505) (0.00518) (0.00553) (0.00562) (0.00468) (0.00467)  
Credit Risk 
Ratio 
        -0.0552** 
        (0.0233) 
Off-balance 
Sheet Ratio 
        0.000314 
        (0.000513) 
Constant 0.0530 -0.132 -0.460 -0.651 -0.239 -0.514 -0.602 -0.607 -0.336 
(0.186) (0.193) (0.524) (0.564) (0.525) (0.597) (0.536) (0.562) (0.471) 
         
Observations 13,409 13,296 1,631 1,552 1,479 1,425 1,839 1,772 2,142 
R-squared 0.182 0.190 0.122 0.139 0.195 0.212 0.173 0.184 0.170 
Number of 
banks 2,204 2,180 308 290 259 248 404 385 385 
Year fixed 
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bank fixed 
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
This table presents the results of robustness tests. We use these tests to mitigate the concern that our findings are not influenced by some of our sample selection 
choices. In addition, we add additional controls in case some bank-specific tax planning items change over time. We estimate the following model: 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =   𝛽0 +
 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝑖𝑗𝑡                                        
The dependent variable is ETR measured as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. Treat*Post equals to one if (1) the bank is in the country with a negative interest 
rate policy (2) during and after a negative interest rate policy is adopted, and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) show results of regressions including U.S. banks 
in the sample. Columns (3) and (4) shows results of regressions excluding Japanese banks in the sample. Columns (5) and (6) present results for tests on banks 
identified as global ultimate owners, excluding banks classified as “independent company” or “single location”. Columns (7) and (8) present results excluding the 
adoption year. In column (9), we add additional control for credit risk (the ratio of loan loss provisions on total assets) and off-balance-sheet ratio (the ratio of off-
balance sheet items on total assets). We set Credit Risk Ratio to zero if data is missing or negative. We set the Off-balance Sheet Ratio to zero if missing. Size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of bank total assets. ROAE is the return on average equity. Equity Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. 
Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of bank liquid assets on total assets. Cost-to-income Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. Non-interest 
Income Ratio is the ratio of non-interest income on operating revenues. Fees & Commissions Ratio is the ratio of fees and commissions income to total assets. 
Interest Income Ratio is the ratio of interest income on total assets. Interest Expenses Ratio is the ratio of interest expenses on total assets. Net Interest Margin is 
measured as the difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by the amount of interest earning assets. One over Pretax Profit 
is calculated as one over pre-tax income. STR is the average statutory corporate income tax rate in the country. GDP Growth represents the annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured as the yearly consumer price index in percentage. ETRs are winsorized at 0 and 1. All other variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% level. All variables are as defined in Appendix C. All regressions include bank fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 




Table 5: Robustness Tests: Event-based Difference-in-Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Aligned DID Aligned DID PSM-Matched Sample PSM-Matched Sample 
          
Treat*Post  -0.0217* -0.0207* -0.0224* -0.0254* 
 (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0129) 
Size 0.0305 0.0374 -0.000319 0.0263  
(0.0272) (0.0274) (0.0219) (0.0306) 
ROAE -1.164*** -1.319*** -1.273*** -1.368***  
(0.176) (0.197) (0.217) (0.210) 
Equity Ratio 0.370 0.344 0.255 -0.452  
(0.320) (0.380) (0.386) (0.346) 
Liquidity Ratio -0.0319 -0.0444 -0.0121 -0.169  
(0.0723) (0.0737) (0.138) (0.205) 
Cost-to-income Ratio -0.194*** -0.218*** -0.242*** -0.223**  
(0.0548) (0.0590) (0.0812) (0.0905) 
Non-interest Income Ratio  -0.0429  -0.0335  
 (0.0348)  (0.117) 
Fees & Commissions Ratio  0.559  0.705  
 (0.517)  (0.949) 
Interest Income Ratio  0.634  -1.671  
 (2.266)  (2.061) 
Interest Expenses Ratio  1.223  2.842  
 (2.522)  (2.099) 
Net Interest Margin  0.147  5.114  
 (1.873)  (3.770) 
STR 0.484** 0.493** 0.617*** 0.500***  
(0.223) (0.243) (0.149) (0.175) 
GDP Growth -0.00396 -0.00474 -0.00364 -0.00951*  
(0.00334) (0.00348) (0.00519) (0.00560) 
Inflation 0.00512 0.00537 0.00277 0.00202  
(0.00442) (0.00487) (0.00528) (0.00502) 
Constant -0.158 -0.279 0.375 0.0126 
 (0.476) (0.482) (0.364) (0.487) 
     
Observations 2,323 2,226 1,438 1,217 
R-squared 0.131 0.146 0.183 0.199 
Number of banks 425 405 252 212 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
 
To address the potential drawbacks of a staggered difference-in-difference design, we align the event time of negative interest 
rate regime adoptions for our sample. This table presents the results of robustness tests from the following model: 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                                       
The dependent variable is ETR measured as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. Treat*Post equals to one if (1) the bank is 
in the country with a negative interest rate policy (2) during and after a negative interest rate policy is adopted, and zero 
otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) use aligned difference-in-difference design. That is, we align the event time of negative interest 
rate regime adoptions for our sample. Columns (3) and (4) use aligned difference-in-difference for propensity score-matched 
samples based on Size, ROAE, Equity Ratio and Liquidity Ratio. We perform 1 to 1 nearest neighbor matching within caliper 
width without replacement. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of bank total assets. ROAE is the return on average equity. 




Equity Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of bank liquid assets on total assets. 
Cost-to-income Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. Non-interest Income Ratio is the ratio of non-
interest income on operating revenues. Fees & Commissions Ratio is the ratio of fees and commissions income to total assets. 
Interest Income Ratio is the ratio of interest income on total assets. Interest Expenses Ratio is the ratio of interest expenses on 
total assets. Net Interest Margin is measured as the difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities 
divided by the amount of interest earning assets. One over Pretax Profit is calculated as one over pre-tax income. STR is the 
average statutory corporate income tax rate in the country. GDP Growth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. 
Inflation is measured as the yearly consumer price index in percentage. ETRs are winsorized at 0 and 1. All other variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Variables are defined in Appendix C. All regressions include bank fixed effects and year 
fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. 




Table 6: Falsification Test 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ETR ETR ETR ETR 
          
Treat*Post -0.0192 -0.0191 -0.017 -0.0171 
  -0.013 -0.0128 -0.0135 -0.0132 
Size 0.0493* 0.0493* 0.0544* 0.0545*  
-0.0277 -0.0281 -0.0293 -0.0297 
ROAE -1.187*** -1.188*** -1.296*** -1.294***  
-0.152 -0.146 -0.172 -0.168 
Equity Ratio 0.494 0.495 0.468 0.467  
-0.355 -0.354 -0.416 -0.417 
Liquidity Ratio -0.0268 -0.0271 -0.0256 -0.0253  
-0.0652 -0.0645 -0.068 -0.0676 
Cost-to-income Ratio -0.208*** -0.207*** -0.229*** -0.231***  
-0.0587 -0.0599 -0.0623 -0.0644 
Non-interest Income Ratio   -0.0516 -0.0515  
  -0.0403 -0.0404 
Fees & Commissions Ratio   1.001* 1.000*  
  -0.604 -0.602 
Interest Income Ratio   -0.277 -0.275  
  -2.507 -2.511 
Interest Expenses Ratio   0.726 0.732  
  -2.715 -2.718 
Net Interest Margin   0.552 0.551  
  -2.038 -2.04 
STR 0.417* 0.417* 0.408 0.408  
-0.236 -0.238 -0.265 -0.267 
GDP Growth -0.00287 -0.00287 -0.00381 -0.00382  
-0.00292 -0.00292 -0.00295 -0.00294 
Inflation 0.00715* 0.00716* 0.00729* 0.00727*  
-0.00416 -0.00411 -0.00414 -0.00409 
One over Pretax Profit  -0.851 
 
1.183 
  -15.69 
 
-11.62 
Constant -0.458 -0.457 -0.523 -0.525 
 -0.477 -0.482 -0.511 -0.515     
Observations 2,227 2,227 2,142 2,142 
R-squared 0.152 0.153 0.164 0.165 
Number of banks 404 404 385 385 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
 
This table presents the results of our falsification test. We use this test to mitigate concerns that our findings may be an artifact of our 
research design. We set the arbitrary cut-off rate at 0.05% rather than interest rates below zero and repeat the main tests. If our tests 
represent casual evidence of the effect of a negative interest rate, we should not find significant results when using an arbitrary cut-off 
rate. We estimate from the following model: 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                                       
The dependent variable is ETR measured as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. Treat*Post equals to one if (1) the bank is in the 
country with a negative interest rate policy (2) during and after a negative interest rate policy is adopted, and zero otherwise. Columns 
(1) and (2) controls for possibilities and pressure of tax planning, capital structure, risks and operating efficiency. Columns (3) and (4) 




add additional control variables regarding banks’ business models and risks.  Size is measured as the natural logarithm of bank total 
assets. ROAE is the return on average equity. Equity Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio 
of bank liquid assets on total assets. Cost-to-income Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. Non-interest 
Income Ratio is the ratio of non-interest income on operating revenues. Fees & Commissions Ratio is the ratio of fees and commissions 
income to total assets. Interest Income Ratio is the ratio of interest income on total assets. Interest Expenses Ratio is the ratio of interest 
expenses on total assets. Net Interest Margin is measured as the difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities 
divided by the amount of interest earning assets. One over Pretax Profit is calculated as one over pre-tax income. STR is the average 
statutory corporate income tax rate in the country. GDP Growth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Inflation is 
measured as the yearly consumer price index in percentage. ETRs are winsorized at 0 and 1. All other variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% level. Variables are defined in Appendix C. The sample for columns (1) and (2) comprises 2227 observations of 404 banks 
from 2011 to 2017. The sample for columns (3) and (4) comprises 2142 observations of 385 banks from 2011 to 2017. All regressions 
include bank fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
  




Table 7: Cross-sectional Test: Distance to Insolvency 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Low Distance to 
Insolvency 
High Distance to 
Insolvency  
Low Distance to 
Insolvency 
High Distance to 
Insolvency  
          
Treat*Post -0.0419** 0.00344 -0.0410** 0.00408  
(0.0166) (0.0201) (0.0168) (0.0207) 
Size 0.0217 0.0788 0.0336 0.0754  
(0.0315) (0.0534) (0.0354) (0.0532) 
ROAE -1.145*** -1.640*** -1.234*** -1.955***  
(0.183) (0.410) (0.204) (0.474) 
Equity Ratio 0.685* 0.457 0.692* 0.217  
(0.353) (0.372) (0.398) (0.543) 
Liquidity Ratio -0.0708 0.108 -0.0614 0.123  
(0.0818) (0.0980) (0.0897) (0.0877) 
Cost-to-income Ratio -0.357*** -0.117 -0.352*** -0.170 
(0.0841) (0.115) (0.0876) (0.125) 
Non-interest Income Ratio   -0.0129 -0.0770 
  (0.0443) (0.0957) 
Fees & Commissions Ratio   0.652 1.804*** 
  (0.512) (0.352) 
Interest Income Ratio   0.694 3.064 
  (3.186) (5.020) 
Interest Expenses Ratio   -0.629 -0.198 
  (3.205) (5.545) 
Net Interest Margin   -0.605 -0.0722  
  (2.609) (4.541) 
STR 0.159 0.609** 0.110 0.769**  
(0.344) (0.278) (0.372) (0.334) 
GDP Growth -0.00137 -0.00156 -0.00333 -0.00148  
(0.00506) (0.00318) (0.00511) (0.00325) 
Inflation -0.00269 0.0128* -0.00141 0.0120*  
(0.00505) (0.00748) (0.00537) (0.00721) 
Constant 0.170 -1.096 -0.00514 -1.101 
 (0.515) (0.901) (0.572) (0.929)      
Observations 869 814 840 781 
R-squared 0.207 0.143 0.216 0.186 
Number of banks 140 140 134 134 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
 
In this cross-sectional test, we investigate the impact of bank financial constraints. This table presents the results of a staggered 
difference-in-differences analysis when splitting the sample into low and high distance to insolvency, proxied by Z-score. Distance to 
Insolvency is measured as the sum of return on assets and the equity ratio over the standard deviation of the returns. A high Distance to 
Insolvency indicates that there is more room for returns fall to wipe out all equity and thus is an indication for stability. We split banks 
in the treatment group and banks in the control group together using the median Distance to Insolvency per country of the year before 
the adoption of a negative interest rate (we use the year 2015 for the control group). We drop countries with only one bank. We estimate 
the following model for two subgroups respectively: 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =   𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝑖𝑗𝑡                                       
Columns (1) and (2) controls for possibilities and pressure of tax planning, capital structure, risks and operating efficiency. Columns (3) 
and (4) add additional control variables regarding the business model. The dependent variable is ETR measured as tax expense scaled 
by pre-tax income. Treat*Post equals to one if (1)the bank is in the country with a negative interest rate policy (2) during and after a 
negative interest rate policy is adopted, and zero otherwise. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of bank total assets. ROAE is the 
return on average equity. Equity Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of bank liquid assets 
on total assets. Cost-to-income Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. Non-interest Income Ratio is the ratio 




of non-interest income on operating revenues. Fees & Commissions Ratio is the ratio of fees and commissions income to total assets. 
Interest Income Ratio is the ratio of interest income on total assets. Interest Expenses Ratio is the ratio of interest expenses on total 
assets. Net Interest Margin is measured as the difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by the 
amount of interest earning assets. One over Pretax Profit is calculated as one over pre-tax income. STR is the average statutory corporate 
income tax rate in the country. GDP Growth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured as the yearly 
consumer price index in percentage. ETRs are winsorized at 0 and 1. All other variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
Variables are defined in Appendix C. All regressions include bank fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  




Table 8: Cross-sectional Test: Level of Reserves  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Low Reserve 
(Low Cash at 
Central Bank) 
High Reserve 
(High Cash at 
Central Bank) 
Low Reserve 
(Low Cash at 
Central Bank) 
High Reserve 
(High Cash at 
Central Bank) 
          
Treat*Post  -0.0411*** 0.00109 -0.0421*** -0.00112 
 (0.0126) (0.0229) (0.0128) (0.0214) 
Size 0.0142 0.0850** 0.0129 0.0956**  
(0.0273) (0.0419) (0.0269) (0.0456) 
ROAE -0.955*** -1.466*** -1.038*** -1.682***  
(0.174) (0.249) (0.185) (0.285) 
Equity Ratio -0.225 -0.00596 -0.473** -0.422  
(0.186) (0.247) (0.229) (0.290) 
Liquidity Ratio -0.118 0.0375 -0.131* 0.0287  
(0.0741) (0.0772) (0.0712) (0.0848) 
Cost-to-income Ratio -0.0976 -0.378*** -0.111 -0.397***  
(0.0711) (0.0901) (0.0745) (0.0919) 
Non-interest Income Ratio   -0.0556 0.0757 
  (0.0430) (0.101) 
Fees & Commissions Ratio   1.645*** 1.299** 
  (0.459) (0.630) 
Interest Income Ratio   3.544 2.072 
  (2.768) (3.116) 
Interest Expenses Ratio   -4.766* -0.636 
  (2.842) (3.416) 
Net Interest Margin   -1.204 -0.306  
  (2.471) (2.691) 
STR 0.257 0.424 0.124 0.503  
(0.256) (0.329) (0.269) (0.371) 
GDP Growth 0.000224 -0.00165 -0.00110 -0.00217  
(0.00391) (0.00499) (0.00403) (0.00482) 
Inflation 0.00191 0.00611 0.00140 0.00483  
(0.00448) (0.00837) (0.00437) (0.00812) 
Constant 0.169 -0.859 0.236 -1.093 
 (0.427) (0.724) (0.422) (0.823)      
Observations 1,074 987 1,030 952 
R-squared 0.129 0.209 0.152 0.226 
Number of banks 184 184 175 175 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
 
In this cross-sectional test, we investigate whether the effect of a negative interest rate on tax planning is different conditional on the 
level of bank reserves. This table presents the results of a staggered difference-in-differences analysis when splitting the sample into 
low and high reserve measured as cash at central bank. Cash at Central Bank is calculated as cash and balances at central bank scaled 
by total assets. We split banks in the treatment group and banks in the control group together using the median reserve per country of 
the year before the adoption of a negative interest rate (we use year 2015 for the control group). We drop countries with only one bank. 
We estimate the following model for two subgroups respectively: 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =   𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝑖𝑗𝑡                                       
The dependent variable is ETR measured as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. Treat*Post equals to one if (1) the bank is in the 
country with a negative interest rate policy (2) during and after a negative interest rate policy is adopted, and zero otherwise. Columns 
(1) and (2) controls for possibilities and pressure of tax planning, capital structure, risks and operating efficiency. Columns (3) and (4) 
add additional control variables regarding business model. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of bank total assets. ROAE is the 
return on average equity. Equity Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of bank liquid assets 
on total assets. Cost-to-income Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. Non-interest Income Ratio is the ratio 




of non-interest income on operating revenues. Fees & Commissions Ratio is the ratio of fees and commissions income to total assets. 
Interest Income Ratio is the ratio of interest income on total assets. Interest Expenses Ratio is the ratio of interest expenses on total 
assets. Net Interest Margin is measured as the difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by the 
amount of interest earning assets. One over Pretax Profit is calculated as one over pre-tax income. STR is the average statutory corporate 
income tax rate in the country. GDP Growth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured as the yearly 
consumer price index in percentage. ETRs are winsorized at 0 and 1. All other variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
Variables are defined in Appendix C. All regressions include bank fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  




Table 9: Cross-sectional Test: Tax Enforcement 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Low Enforcement High Enforcement Low Enforcement High Enforcement 
          
Treat*Post  -0.0389*** -0.0209 -0.0385*** -0.0171  
(0.0142) (0.0181) (0.0141) (0.0180) 
Size 0.0429 0.0384 0.0366 0.0592  
(0.0349) (0.0356) (0.0355) (0.0384) 
ROAE -1.226*** -1.248*** -1.280*** -1.445***  
(0.174) (0.239) (0.187) (0.278) 
Equity Ratio 0.848*** -0.335* 0.845*** -0.499**  
(0.266) (0.180) (0.267) (0.229) 
Liquidity Ratio -0.0992 -0.0588 -0.0787 -0.0825  
(0.0661) (0.0836) (0.0772) (0.0886) 
Cost-to-income Ratio -0.231*** -0.182** -0.256*** -0.225**  
(0.0753) (0.0852) (0.0754) (0.0892) 
Non-interest Income Ratio   -0.173** -0.0125  
  (0.0825) (0.0426) 
Fees & Commissions Ratio   -0.167 1.841***  
  (0.605) (0.424) 
Interest Income Ratio   -1.491 3.105  
  (2.226) (3.678) 
Interest Expenses Ratio   2.679 -3.079  
  (2.165) (4.139) 
Net Interest Margin   1.393 -1.830  
  (1.668) (3.121) 
STR 0.186 0.839 0.212 0.766  
(0.286) (0.746) (0.313) (0.731) 
GDP Growth -6.01e-05 -0.00458 -0.000509 -0.00545  
(0.00534) (0.00408) (0.00557) (0.00405) 
Inflation 0.00496 0.00802 0.00475 0.00511  
(0.00529) (0.0123) (0.00543) (0.0131) 
Constant -0.322 -0.255 -0.154 -0.538  
(0.586) (0.637) (0.578) (0.692) 
     
Observations 1,074 1,153 1,041 1,101 
R-squared 0.229 0.132 0.243 0.160 
Number of banks 194 210 186 199 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
     
 
In this cross-sectional test, we investigate the tax substitution effect vary based on the level of enforcement on corporate income tax. 
This table presents the results of a staggered difference-in-differences analysis when splitting the sample into low and high tax 
enforcement. Enforcement is measured as total spending on tax enforcement as a percentage of country-year GDP in 2011We split banks 
in the treatment group and banks in the control group together using the median of enforcement divided by GDP in 2011, the first year 
in the sample. We drop countries with only one bank. We estimate the following model for two subgroups respectively: 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =   𝛽0 +
 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝑖𝑗𝑡                                       
The dependent variable is ETR measured as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. Treat*Post equals to one if (1) the bank is in the 
country with a negative interest rate policy (2) during and after a negative interest rate policy is adopted, and zero otherwise. Columns 
(1) and (2) controls for possibilities and pressure of tax planning, capital structure, risks and operating efficiency. Columns (3) and (4) 




add additional control variables regarding business model. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of bank total assets. ROAE is the 
return on average equity. Equity Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of bank liquid assets 
on total assets. Cost-to-income Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. Non-interest Income Ratio is the ratio 
of non-interest income on operating revenues. Fees & Commissions Ratio is the ratio of fees and commissions income to total assets. 
Interest Income Ratio is the ratio of interest income on total assets. Interest Expenses Ratio is the ratio of interest expenses on total 
assets. Net Interest Margin is measured as the difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by the 
amount of interest earning assets. One over Pretax Profit is calculated as one over pre-tax income. STR is the average statutory corporate 
income tax rate in the country. GDP Growth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured as the yearly 
consumer price index in percentage. ETRs are winsorized at 0 and 1. All other variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
Variables are defined in Appendix C. All regressions include bank fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 




Table 10: Cross-sectional Test: Trust in Government 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Low Trust High Trust Low Trust High Trust 
          
Treat*Post  -0.0778*** -0.0170 -0.0847*** -0.0111 
(0.0162) (0.0201) (0.0174) (0.0211) 
Size 0.0544 0.0366 0.0312 0.0465  
(0.0589) (0.0265) (0.0631) (0.0295) 
ROAE -1.900*** -0.651*** -1.959*** -0.739***  
(0.251) (0.162) (0.272) (0.198) 
Equity Ratio 0.472 0.525 0.295 0.525  
(0.351) (0.343) (0.418) (0.397) 
Liquidity Ratio -0.121 0.0657 -0.0756 0.0548  
(0.0759) (0.0746) (0.0878) (0.0806) 
Cost-to-income Ratio -0.389*** -0.0707 -0.414*** -0.0838  
(0.0883) (0.0713) (0.0867) (0.0782) 
Non-interest Income Ratio   -0.139 -0.0308  
  (0.0909) (0.0394) 
Fees & Commissions Ratio   1.351* 0.834  
  (0.763) (0.728) 
Interest Income Ratio   2.619 -0.719  
  (3.731) (2.670) 
Interest Expenses Ratio   -1.997 1.121  
  (3.418) (3.121) 
Net Interest Margin   -2.264 0.821  
  (4.337) (2.160) 
STR 0.00437 0.827 -0.0232 0.776  
(0.239) (0.552) (0.265) (0.539) 
GDP Growth -0.00393 0.00114 -0.00388 -0.00167  
(0.00546) (0.00329) (0.00536) (0.00328) 
Inflation -0.00747 0.00626 -0.0116 0.00638  
(0.00670) (0.00499) (0.00757) (0.00520) 
Constant -0.240 -0.494 0.218 -0.623  
(0.992) (0.492) (1.062) (0.543) 
 
    
Observations 1,070 1,151 1,050 1,086 
R-squared 0.263 0.122 0.273 0.135 
Number of banks 186 217 182 202 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
 
In this cross-sectional test, we investigate whether the documented tax substitution effect is larger in countries with low trust in 
government. This table presents the results of a staggered difference-in-differences analysis when splitting the sample into low and high 
trust in government (split at the median of trust in 2011, the first year in the sample). Trust is the average of two measures: business 
executives’ perceptions of government policy is transparent, and government decisions are effectively implemented. We drop countries 
with only one bank. We estimate the following model for each group: 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =   𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 +  𝑖𝑗𝑡                                       
The dependent variable is ETR measured as tax expense scaled by pre-tax income. Treat*Post equals to one if (1) the bank is in the 
country with a negative interest rate policy (2) during and after a negative interest rate policy is adopted, and zero otherwise. Columns 
(1) and (2) controls for possibilities and pressure of tax planning, capital structure, risks and operating efficiency. Columns (3) and (4) 
add additional control variables regarding the business model. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of bank total assets. ROAE is 
the return on average equity. Equity Ratio represents the ratio of bank equity on total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of bank liquid 
assets on total assets. Cost-to-income Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses on net operating income. Non-interest Income Ratio is the 
ratio of non-interest income on operating revenues. Fees & Commissions Ratio is the ratio of fees and commissions income to total 
assets. Interest Income Ratio is the ratio of interest income on total assets. Interest Expenses Ratio is the ratio of interest expenses on 




total assets. Net Interest Margin is measured as the difference between interest earning assets and interest bearing liabilities divided by 
the amount of interest earning assets. One over Pretax Profit is calculated as one over pre-tax income. STR is the average statutory 
corporate income tax rate in the country. GDP Growth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Inflation is measured as 
the yearly consumer price index in percentage. ETRs are winsorized at 0 and 1. All other variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. Variables are defined in Appendix C. All regressions include bank fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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